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Corporate Governance: Who Controls
the Large Corporation?
By THOMAS M. JONES*
Introduction
The broad issue before this symposium is the social control of
business or corporate social responsibility. Much of the current discus-
sion related to this issue centers on methods of assuring that those who
make corporate decisions do so in a manner responsive to the public
purpose, however defined. A vital question, preliminary to any discus-
sion of changes in the methods of corporate decision making is: "Who
controls the corporation?" Other ways of phrasing the question would
be: "Whose behavior must be modified in order to assure corporate
social responsibility?" or, more radically, "Who must be replaced as the
principal decision-makers in the corporation?"
To many of those concerned with corporate governance, the an-
swer is obvious: corporate managers control most of the major corpo-
rations in this country. However, significant opposition to the
managerial power thesis exists. As recently as 1974, an extensive cri-
tique of this thesis was advanced by Maurice Zeitlin, who also cited the
work of other scholars disputing the conclusion that the "managerial
revolution" is complete.' Thus, it is not clear to everyone concerned
with the social control of business just who must be controlled. This
Article will deal explicitly with the methodological issues which are at
the heart of the controversy and will offer a "best estimate" answer to
the question, "Who controls the corporation?"
Historical Development of Corporate Control
The first corporations were clearly creatures of the state, originally
as a result of royal charters and later as a result of legislative charters.
* B.S.E., 1964, University of Michigan; M.B.A., 1970, University of Washington;
Ph.D., 1977, University of California Berkeley. Assistant Professor of Business Administra-
tion, University of Washington.
1. Zeitlin, Corporate Ownershop and Control- The Large Corporation and the Capitalist
Class, 79 AM. J. Soc. 1073 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Zeitlin].
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By limiting the capital that could be accumulated, the purposes for
which it could be used, and the length of time that the corporation
could remain in business, the state, be it the Crown or the legislature,
effectively controlled the first corporations.2
The advent of general incorporation statutes effectively ended
state control of corporate enterprise. When perpetual life, unlimited
accumulation of capital, and incorporation for any lawful business pur-
pose became characteristic features of state incorporation statutes, state
control of business enterprise evaporated. 3
With the disappearance of state control shareholder owners were
free to operate their corporate entities as they saw fit. Since most firms
had relatively few shareholders and few firms either required or could
afford professional managers, control rested securely in the hands of
the shareholders. Indeed, up to the turn of the century, large and
prominent companies remained the corporate extensions of personali-
ties like John D. Rockefeller and Andrew Carnegie.
Death and taxes, combined with an increasingly liquid stock mar-
ket, tended to disperse the shareholdings of many of these family-con-
trolled businesses and to draw new capital from numerous smaller
investors. This process was well underway by 1932 when Berle and
Means published their classic work, The Modern Corporation and Pri-
vate Property.4 The authors examined the dispersion of shares of the
top 200 nonfinancial firms5 and found forty-four percent of them to be
under management control.6 If the shareholdings of a firm were so dis-
persed that a compact group of holdings totaled no more than twenty
percent of the outstanding shares, then, reasoned Berle and Means, ef-
fective stockholder control would be difficult, and effective control
must lie with the professional managers. 7 In addition, the authors
found that another twenty-one percent of those 200 firms were con-
trolled through some form of legal device, such as a holding company,
involving a small proportion of the total stock. 8
2. Some early statutes also called for the auditing of corporate activities on a continu-
ous basis. D. VOTAW, MODERN CORPORATIONS 23 (1965).
3. R. Nader, The Casefor Federal Chartering, in R. NADER & M. GREEN, CORPORATE
POWER IN AMERICA 68 (1973).
4. A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY
(rev. ed. 1967) [hereinafter cited as BERLE & MEANS].
5. That is, railroads, utilities, and industrials.
6. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 4, at 106. Using a classification scheme whereby firms
could be split into two categories, Berle and Means actually found 88-1/2 firms to be under
management control.
7. Id at 108.
8. Id at 106.
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Berle and Means also studied trends in statutory and case law that
bore on the issue of corporate control and determined that the law had
provided management with greatly expanded freedom from share-
holder interference with corporate affairs. This legal evidence, in addi-
tion to the dispersion of shareholdings, led Berle and Means to
conclude that ownership and control of corporate property were in sep-
arate hands; ownership remained with the stockholders, but control
rested with management.
In 1966, Robert Lamer updated Berle and Means' work with mi-
nor methodological changes. Using a management-control cutoff point
of ten percent (versus Berle and Means' twenty percent), he found that
167 of the top 200 firms (or 83.5%) were management controlled.9 The
remainder (16.5%) were controlled by some means related to the own-
ership of stock. The split of ownership and control was virtually com-
plete; the "managerial revolution" was over and management had
emerged as the victor.
The Opposition
This conventional notion of managerial control has not gone un-
challenged. In a recent critique of the Berle and Means/Lamer thesis,
Maurice Zeitlin reviewed the studies of several other researchers who
dispute the management-control thesis and highlighted several meth-
odological problems present in the study of corporate control.10 He
then expanded Lamer's list of ownership-controlled firms in the top
50011 by adding first, those firms that other studies found to have "defi-
nite centers of [ownership] control"; second, firms at least ten percent of
whose stock was held by a single bank; and, third, firms controlled
through a legal device. He then added seventeen firms that, because
they were privately held, were not included in Fortune's 500 list. He
next dropped the cutoff for single-bank control from ten percent to five
percent, thus adding fourteen more corporations. His revised list of
ownership-controlled firms totalled 211 (or 42.2%) of the top 500 com-
panies,' 2 leaving 57.8% under management control, a far cry from the
nearly total (83.5%) management control claimed by Lamer.
9. R. LARNER, MANAGEMENT CONTROL AND THE LARGE CORPORATION 12 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as LARNER].
10. Zeitlin, supra note 1, at 1085-89.
11. Larner's study examined both the top 200 and the top 500, with the latter group
showing somewhat less manager control. Zeitlin considers the top 500 more relevant than
the top 200. LARNER, supra note 9, at 12-13, 17-18.
12. Zeitlin, supra note 1, at 1087.
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Zeitlin also emphasized the difficulty of locating ownership in
large industrial firms, since shares are often held in the names of voting
trusts, foundations, holding companies, brokers, nominees, and bank
trust departments rather than in the names of the beneficial owners.
This potential concealment of concentrated holdings, in addition to the
"revealed" concentrations outlined above, convinced Zeitlin that the
issue of control of the corporation was far from resolved.
The Importance of the Issue
At this juncture, one might ask, "What difference does it make
who controls the corporation?" Why would Zeitlin and others bother
to reexamine an issue considered by many to have been resolved years
ago? There are many answers to this question, each important to cer-
tain groups of scholars and corporate activists.
First, Zeitlin's interest in the issue apparently is founded upon a
desire to reaffirm the existence of a dominant capitalist class. The
"class" analyses of social structure and behavior depend heavily on the
existence of such a dominant class; 13 concepts such as capitalist ex-
ploitation, social domination, and class conflict are meaningless if no
such class exists. If control of the means of production by ownership
interests were found to be statistically unimportant relative to manager
control, whole areas of economic, sociological, and political theory
would be based upon a false premise and could, therefore, be dis-
missed. Certain Neo-Marxian theorists, therefore, have a large stake in
the control issue.
Another reason for examining corporate control centers on politi-
cal power in society. As political scientists well know, only so much
can be learned about political power in society by limiting research to
the traditionally political institutions-the legislative, executive and ju-
dicial branches of government and the administrative agencies. Corpo-
rations, too, make decisions that have great social and political impact.
Hence, the question of who governs cannot be fully answered without
answering the corollary question: "Who governs the corporation?"
Another facet of the issue involves the legitimacy of the power al-
legedly wielded by corporate managers. Edwin Epstein has defined le-
gitimate power as power that is conceded, by those affected by it, to be
13. See, e.g., G. DOMHOFF, WHO RULES AMERICA? 9 (1967); G. KOLKO, WEALTH AND
POWER IN AMERICA 9 (1962). But it should be noted that some Marxian analysts do not
depend on the separation of ownership and control. See P. BARAN & P. SWEEZY, MONOP-
OLY CAPITAL 15-16 (1966).
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rightful and proper.' 4 The traditional justification for the exercise of
economic power is that the owner of private property can use it as he
wishes. If, however, ownership and control of productive property
have been separated, as manager control advocates claim, some new
form of legitimation must be found.
Certainly the validity of many economic models depends on cor-
porate control. For example, theories stressing profit maximization as-
sume obedience to shareholder wishes. But if managers now hold the
corporate reins, the goals of the corporate system may have shifted
from profits to growth and/or technological prominence, as suggested
by Marris, Baumol, and Galbraith.'5 Such a change in the locus of
corporate control would render economic models based on profit max-
imization considerably less convincing than they would otherwise be.
The last, and most important, reason for conclusively locating cor-
porate control was suggested earlier. If we, as a society, seek to change
the behavior of those who make decisions on behalf of the corporation,
we must first know who these decisionmakers are. For example, it
would make little sense to direct our attention to restructuring the
board of directors if shareholders could routinely replace directors who
ignored shareholder wishes in favor of the public purpose. Students of
social responsibility should, therefore, find the issue of corporate con-
trol of prime interest.
Methodological Issues
Suppose, for the moment, that we agree with Zeitlin that the con-
ventional notion of managerial control of major corporations is in
doubt from an empirical point of view. How might we resolve the
problem? Zeitlin himself suggests one approach:
The methods and procedures, and the basic concepts and units of
analysis, in such research will have to be quite different than those
which have been most commonly employed in the past. Most impor-
tant, such research must focus at the outset on the complex relation-
ships in which the single corporation is itself involved: the particular
pattern of holdings and their evolution within the corporation; and
the relationships between it and other corporations; the forms of per-
sonal union or interlocking between corporate directorates and be-
tween the officers and directors and principal shareholding families;
the connections with banks, both as "financial institutions" and as
14. Epstein, Book Review, 60 CALIF. L. REV. 1701, 1703 (1972).
15. See W. BAUMOL, BUSINESS BEHAVIOR, VALUE AND GROWTH (1967); J. GAL-
BRAITH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE (2d ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as GALBRAITH]; R.
MARRIS, THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF 'MANAGERIAL' CAPITALISM (1964).
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the agents of specified propertied interests, including those who con-
trol the banks themselves; the network of intercorporate and princi-
pal common shareholdings. In a word, it will be necessary to explore
in detail the institutional and class structure in which the individual
large corporations are situated.'
6
Three features of this approach are worthy of comment. First,
Zeitlin advocates a higher level of analysis; firms must be studied not in
isolation, but in the context of the entire industrial-financial system.
This systems approach is interesting but hardly novel; interlocking di-
rectorates and family relationships have been examined before. Zeitlin
must, therefore, be suggesting that such studies be more thorough in
the future. Second, he directs attention to the evolution of sharehold-
ing patterns within the corporation. This approach is intuitively ap-
pealing and would shed light on such problems as how to determine
whether a manager who holds stock in his firm is: (a) a manager be-
cause he holds stock, or (b) a stockholder because he is a manager. The
historical perspective supplied by such analysis would indeed be an im-
provement over the analyses currently available (such as Lamer's) that
examine only a single cross-section in time.
Third, Zeitlin's approach is clearly structural rather than behav-
ioral; he proposes in-depth examination of the structure of share own-
ership and of all the relationships that prevail among leaders of
corporate enterprise in order to uncover patterns of control. Zeitlin's
remedy for the methodological ills of prior studies was made explicit in
another context: "[A]s I have emphasized repeatedly, it is necessary to
study the concrete situation within the corporation and the constella-
tion of intercorporate relationships in which it is involved before one
can begin to understand where control is actually located."'1
7
The central argument of the remainder of this section is that Zeit-
lin's strategy or any other structural approach to corporate control is
flawed, perhaps fatally, for five reasons. Three of these reasons involve
the sensitivity of the analysis to certain tactical judgments that must be
made whenever a structural strategy is employed. Two others involve
critical flaws in the structural analysis strategy itself.
Specification of Parameters
Collectively, the available structural studies on the locus of corpo-
rate power raise a critical question: How can such vastly different con-
clusions result from approximately the same data base-the pattern of
16. Zeitlin, supra note 1, at 1107-08.
17. Id at 1090.
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stock ownership of the largest corporations? More specifically, how
does one researcher find control groups where another does not? 18 The
answer lies, in part, in the specification of the parameters used by each
researcher for determining control. First, how many units (persons,
families, institutions) constitute a control group? Is five, or fifty, the
maximum number of shareholders able to maintain sufficient commu-
nication and agreement to alter management decisions? Second, what
level of apparent cohesiveness is necessary to form an effective control
group? A family? Two banks located on the same street? A group of
business associates? Members of the Commercial Club? Third, what
percentage of the stock must a group own to insure control? In some
cases, five percent might suffice; in others, fifteen percent might not.19
The critical element may be whether the holder of the stock is trying to
perpetuate control or to seize control, suggesting that two cutoff points
might be more appropriate than one for the determination of control in
a corporation. Even with two such points, however, the percentage
limits must be arbitrary.
All three questions highlight a common problem-arbitrary
specification of the parameters of control. Since the outcome of an
analysis may well hinge on this choice of parameters, any arbitrary se-
lection necessarily introduces the risk of significant bias.
Necessary Inferences
A second, related methodological problem raised by Zeitlin's pro-
posed research strategy (and by the Berle and Means/Lamer strategy)
concerns the inferences required to locate control within the firm. Both
sides of the corporate control debate rest their conclusions on infer-
ences that lack empirical support. The Berle and Means camp, seeing
relatively dispersed holdings, concludes that control cannot rest with
the stockholders, and thus, must rest with the residual cate-
gory-management. But could not a former majority shareholder (per-
haps a founder or co-founder), even with greatly reduced holdings,
exert control over the firm he once owned?
Zeitlin's school sees blocks of stock in the hands of sundry associa-
tions of people and institutions and concludes that control must reside
with such groups. This assumes first, that the individual units of the
18. For contrast, see LARNER, supra note 9; Sheehan, Proprietors in the World of Big
Business, FORTUNE, June 15, 1967, at 178.
19. For example, a German firm, Mannesmann AG, was apparently unable to control
Algoma Steel (of Canada) with 25% of the outstanding shares. See Highballing into Bigger
Profits via the United States, Bus. WEEK, Feb. 23, 1976, at 60, 62.
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group want to control the corporation, and second, that collectively the
group is capable of sufficient concerted action to act on its desires. In
short, collusion based on common interests is assumed where none may
exist.
Although both types of inference lack empirical support, they are
not equally dubious. Indeed, the Berle and Means inference appears
much more tenable since it does not assume positive, active stockholder
motivation regarding control of the company in question. Numerous
commentators have sought to discover precisely what degree of corpo-
rate control is in fact desired by shareholders. Phillip Blumberg has
concluded that institutional investors are quite reluctant to attempt to
influence or control corporate affairs, particularly since a fund's market
performance is more apt to respond favorably to a simple selling of the
shares in question.20 Joseph Livingston has suggested that even indi-
vidual investors with large holdings may be inclined to "leave someone
else holding the bag" rather than challenge an errant management. 2'
In addition, at least one trust-fund manager has gone so far as to
specifically disavow the desire to vote the shares of funds under his
control.22 For these reasons, theories based upon assumed, positive
stockholder motivation are especially vulnerable. Further, the Berle
and Means inference does not presuppose that banks with large ac-
counts have voting rights for those shares: Blumberg indicates that vot-
ing rights frequently do not accompany investment discretion for fund
managers. 23
Definition of Control
A third major methodological problem lies in the definition of
control itself, for control, like power, is an elusive concept. If it is de-
fined as the power to select the majority of the board of directors, la
Berle and Means,24 control could be located simply be determining
who nominates the board members actually elected, and management
control would, therefore, probably be found in a great majority of cor-
porations, since management slates of candidates are almost routinely
approved by shareholders. But if, as Myles Mace concludes, most di-
20. P. BLUMBERG, THE MEGACORPORATION IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 140-41 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as BLUMBERG].
21. J. LIVINGSTON, THE AMERICAN STOCKHOLDER 37 (1963).
22. R. NADER, M. GREEN & J. SELIGMAN, CONSTITUTIONALIZING THE CORPORATION:
THE CASE FOR THE FEDERAL CHARTERING OF GIANT CORPORATIONS 113-14 (1976).
23. BLUMBERG, supra note 20, at 125.
24. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 4, at 66-67.
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rectors are confined to an advisory role and have little decision-making
capacity,25 the power to select board members may be of marginal sig-
nificance at best. On the other hand, recent developments at Northrup
and RCA suggest that the board can exert some control independent of
either shareholders or management. 26 In both corporations, the chair-
man resigned under pressure from the rest of a board apparently free of
domination by large stockholder interests. These examples illustrate
the shortcomings of structural definitions of control.
The definition of control that Zeitlin proposes is, however, equally
ambiguous: "[W]hen the concrete structure of ownership and of inter-
corporate relationships makes it probable that an identifiable group of
proprietary interests will be able to realize their corporate objectives
over time, despite resistance, then we may say that they have 'control'
of the corporation."2 7 The key to this definition's ambiguity is the
phrase "makes it probable." Who decides what is probable and what is
not? It is unlikely that Lamer and Zeitlin would agree on the locus of
control for the marginal firms under this definition.
All three" of the above-mentioned methodological problems point
to a single conclusion: it is unlikely that the question of corporate con-
trol will ever be conclusively resolved by means of a structural analysis
of shareholdings, no matter how extensive. Suppose, for example, that
Zeitlin's view of the structure of shareholdings and even of interlocking
directorates were conceded to be essentially correct. The conditions of
this structure could be summarized as follows: (1) Individual and insti-
tutional shareholdings are highly concentrated in the aggregate; (2)
Wealthy individuals and institutions hold large blocks of stock in
several firms; (3) Corporate executives often hold blocks of stock in
several firms, including their own; (4) Corporate officers and bankers
often sit on the boards of other enterprises. The implication is that an
economic elite exists. Few would deny that a relatively small number
of individuals and institutions dominates the economy. Interlocking
directorates abound. Directors are usually chosen for the prestige
25. M. MACE, DImEcTORs: MYrH AND REALITY 179 (1971) [hereinafter cited as
MACE].
26. At Northrup, Chairman Thomas V. Jones resigned after the firm's executive com-
mittee saddled him with most of the responsibility for illegal payments made by the com-
pany. The Biggest Payoff, TIME, July 28, 1975, at 56. At RCA, Chairman Robert Sarnoff
was forced to resign under board pressure after the firm's earnings dropped markedly. he
No. 2 Man's in the Hot Seat Bus. WEEK, Jan. 26, 1976, at 25; Sarnoffs Abunpt Quitting as
RCA Chief Seen the Work of Conrad, Other Officials, Wall St. J., Nov. 11, 1975, at 6.
27. Zeitlin, supra note 1, at 1091.
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value of their proven success in the business world.28 Further, invest-
ment bankers' financial knowledge makes them valuable as directors.
29
Wealthy individuals and institutions do hold large blocks of stock
in other firms, but this could be an attempt to diversify their portfolios
and/or stabilize their incomes rather than to establish a coordinated
macro-control mechanism. Executives do hold blocks of stock in their
own firms, but this may often have resulted from the exercise of lucra-
tive stock options rather than from conscious attempts to gain or main-
tain control. In short, a look at the structure of shareholdings, even
including interlocking directorates, yields little in the way of conclusive
evidence regarding control of corporations. Rather, since the resolu-
tion of the three problems discussed above (i.e. (1) the specification of
parameters, (2) necessary inferences required to locate corporate con-
trol, and (3) the definition of "control" itself) can be critical to the
analysis, studies based on these judgments may only reveal the predis-
position of the researcher. If, as Mannheim has postulated, each indi-
vidual's ideas are "functions of his existence, ' 30 we might well expect
ideological commitments to determine the outcome of any analysis of
corporate control based on structural variables. Benjamin Ward has
summarized this problem quite succinctly: "The world is analyzed dif-
ferently depending on what you plan to do with it.
' 3
The tactical problems discussed thus far, though serious, do not
exhaust the methodological difficulties involved in structural analysis
of corporate control. On a strategic level, the propriety of structural
analysis itself must be seriously questioned. Two problems with which
structural analysis is utterly incapable of dealing support this
judgment.
Other Reasons for Management Control
First, an examination of shareholding patterns cannot, under any
circumstances, reveal control which results from causes other than con-
centrated (or dispersed) ownership of corporate shares. For example,
management may have wrested control from shareholders through ad-
ministrative or technical expertise or through formal authority over the
organization and the information it produces. These are causal factors
completely unrelated to stock ownership. As Mace has concluded,
even boards of directors are not usually capable of second guessing
28. MACE, supra note 25, at 195.
29. Id at 200.
30. K. MANNHEIM, IDEOLOGY AND UTOPIA 56 (1936).
31. B. WARD, WHAT'S WRONG WITH EcONoMics? 67 (1972).
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management. 32 Indeed, if management control and dispersion of
shares are related at all, it is possible that investor frustration with try-
ing to control management has led to a widespread diversification of
large portfolios; causality may, in fact, be reversed. Structural analysis
6f corporate control is incapable of evaluating this appealing theory.
In addition, structural analysis fails to take into account changes in
corporate law that may have facilitated a shift from stockholder to
management control. According to one commentator, existing law
seems to place shareholders at a disadvantage in their power struggle
with management.33 Specific legal impediments to stockholder control
include the inability of stockholders to place board candidates on the
company proxy ballot,34 the board's effective veto power over such
structural matters as mergers, sale of substantially all assets, voluntary
dissolution, and charter amendments, 35 and the legality in many states
of staggered terms for directors.3 6 Evidence of this type has led Nader,
Green, and Seligman to assert that recent changes in state corporate
law have attempted to greatly restrict shareholder voting.37 Whether or
not these legal restrictions significantly affect the locus of corporate
control is not at issue here. The point is simply that any structural
analysis of shareholding patterns is incapable of considering the effect
of such legal devices.
Other Possible Loci of Corporate Power
The second strategic difficulty with structural analysis is that, even
if it could surmount all the above problems, it still would be useful only
to establish the division of power between ownership interests and a
32. MACE, supra note 25, at 184-86.
33. Although he was writing to provide normative models for statutory reform, Melvin
Eisenberg's descriptions of existing law lead to this conclusion. See Eisenberg, The Legal
Roles of Shareholders and Management in Modern Corporate Decisionmaking, 57 CALIF. L.
REV. 1 (1969); Eisenberg, Access to the Corporate Proxy Machinery, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1489
(1970); Eisenberg, Megasubsidiaries: The Effect of Corporate Structure on Corporate Control,
84 HARv. L. REv. 1577 (1971); Eisenberg, Legal Models of Management Structure in the
Modern Corporation: Officers, Directors, and Accountants, 63 CALIF. L. REv. 375 (1975).
34. SEC Proxy Rules indicate that shareholders must solicit their own proxies. How-
ever, Eisenberg suggests that a correct interpretation of certain legal principles would allow
shareholder use of corporate proxies for the nomination of directors. See Eisenberg, Access
to the Corporate Proxy Machinery, 83 HARv. L. REv. 1489, 1503-11 (1970).
35. Eisenberg, The Legal Roles of Shareholders and Management in Corporate
Decisionmaking, 57 CALIF. L. REv. 1, 61-68 (1969).
36. R. NADER, M. GREEN & J. SELIGMAN, CONSTITUTIONALIZING THE CORPORATION:
THE CASE FOR THE FEDERAL CHARTERING OF GIANT CORPORATIONS 109-10 (1976).
37. R. NADER, M. GREEN & J. SELIGMAN, TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATION 91
(1976).
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residual category-presumably management. Such analysis is inher-
ently incapable of locating control in the hands of the "technostruc-
ture," as defined by Galbraith;38 government bureaucrats, as suggested
by Weidenbaum; 39 or finance capitalists, the traditional villains of capi-
talism. Structural analysis cannot find centers of control in these
groups because it does not even consider them; they are excluded by
assumption.
Thus, although we may agree with Zeitlin's claim that the empiri-
cal issue of control of the corporation is still an open one, we must
reject structural analysis as an adequate approach to its resolution.
Alternative Methods
Four principal methods exist for studying power or control in or-
ganizations. These methods can be succinctly summarized by reference
to the central question each asks about organizational decisions, that is,
"Who participates?;" "Who gains?, Who loses?;" "Who has political
resources?;" "Who prevails in decision-making?" The method under-
lying each of these questions is flawed when applied to the study of
corporate control. The first three fall short for theoretical reasons; the
fourth, while theoretically sound, faces serious pragmatic problems.
40
Who Participates?
Research strategies that hinge on the question "Who participates?"
are suspect because participation alone does not guarantee power in an
organization; some participants with formal positions in the organiza-
tion are quite passive in the decision-making process. For example,
Mace has found most corporate directors to be of little consequence in
corporate policymaking.41 Further, participants frequently have con-
flicting goals; not all can win. Some participants are routinely over-
ruled in the decisionmaking process and could hardly be said to have
power, let alone control. Disgruntled shareholders at annual meetings,
although vociferous, are nevertheless usually powerless to effect mean-
ingful change. Thus, methods centering on the question "Who partici-
pates?" will not reveal by themselves the locus of corporate power.
38. GALBRAITH, supra note 15, at 60-71.
39. Weidenbaum, The New Wave of Government Regulation of Business, 15 Bus. &
Soc. REV. 81 (1975).
40. For a more thorough critique of these approaches, see N. POLSBY, COMMUNITY
POWER AND POLITICAL THEORY 122-38 (1963).
41. MACE, supra note 25, at 68.
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Who Gains? Who Loses?
Organizational power can also be studied by asking and answering
the questions, "Who gains?, Who loses?". In a society where rational
self-interest is assumed to dominate human behavior, this strategy has
certain merit. However, theoretical shortcomings also render this
method unsatisfactory. First, "Who gains?" may be determined by
events external to the actual decision in question. Second, irrationali-
ties may occur in the decision process that lead to unexpected distribu-
tions of gains and losses. Third, powerful individuals may
intentionally distribute benefits to those without power. For these rea-
sons, control-locating methods that hinge on the questions "Who
gains?, Who loses?" are theoretically flawed and cannot stand alone in
the determination of the locus of corporate power.
Who Has Political Resources?
A third method of locating corporate power is to examine the dis-
tribution of the political resources that can be brought to bear on the
corporate decisionmaking process. A list of the resources that might be
applied to corporate decisions would include: voting power accruing to
share ownership; time; knowledge and expertise; control of informa-
tion; formal authority in the firm; prestige in the business community;
personal (or organizational) resources; financial leverage; coercive
power of the state; legal advantage.
The problem with examining political resources in organizations is
that several actors may possess such resources simultaneously. It
would be inappropriate to make determinations as to which resource or
combination of resources would prevail in the decision process or in
struggles for control; to do so would assume away the critical
question.4
2
Controversy over the locus of corporate control appears to be rag-
ing solely around the issue of the voting power of stock ownership. As
the present analysis suggests, however, share ownership is only one of
many political resources that can be brought to bear on corporate con-
trol battles. Examples abound of situations where resources other than
share ownership have prevailed in corporate decision-making. Finan-
cial institutions used their financial leverage to assure the ouster of an
Iowa Beef Processors, Inc. director who was allegedly linked to orga-
42. It might be feasible to assume that the coercive power of the state will prevail on
those rare occasions when it is used, but the great bulk of the control battles do not pit the
state against some other group.
May 1979] CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
nized crime.43 Similarly, lending institutions were instrumental in the
replacement of Floyd Hall, chief executive officer of Eastern Airlines.
44
In addition, legal advantage granted to incumbent management by
state takeover statutes has been used to stall takeover bids by other
firms.45 Contrary to the assumptions of structural analyses of corporate
control, therefore, resources other than voting power can and do play a
significant role in corporate control struggles.
In any event, the impact of any political resource may lie in its
being a potential rather than actual source of power. As Polsby has
pointed out in the context of community power studies, political re-
sources do not necessarily determine outcomes; they must be coupled
with both the desire and the skill to use them effectively. 46 Hence, the
study of resource distributions alone cannot definitively locate corpo-
rate control. Further, the notion of potential power is of little use em-
pirically since we can only guess at the magnitude and relative
importance of its various elements. Therefore, our third research strat-
egy for studying corporate control, like its predecessors, is theoretically
flawed.
Who Prevails in Decisionmaking?
A fourth approach for examining the locus of corporate power,
one which concentrates on the question, "Who prevails in corporate
decision making?", avoids the methodological pitfalls of the other
methods. This behavioral model represents a clear departure from
structural analyses of shareholdings. It is adapted from the pluralist
approach47 to studying community power as formulated by Dahl,
Polsby, and Wolfinger in their study of New Haven politics. 48
This method is premised on the assumption that only an investiga-
tion of the actual decisionmaking process can accurately reveal the lo-
cus of power in a corporation. Its basic axiom is that no a priori
assumptions whatever can be made as to who controls the firm. Focus-
ing on the actual exercise of power rather than the nebulous and empir-
ically intractable concept of potential power, this method precludes
having to assume that certain forms of potential power dominate cor-
43. Iowa BeefSays Bodenstein Quits Under Pressure, Wall St. J., Nov. 25, 1975, at 2,
col. 2.
44. New Pilot at Eastern, TIME, Nov. 3, 1975, at 85.
45. See, e.g., Gerber's Board Declines to Back Tender Bid Plan, Wall St. J., April 21,
1977, at 6, col. 4.
46. N. POLSBY, COMMUNITY POWER AND POLITICAL THEORY 120-21 (1963).
47. Id at 112-21.
48. R. DAHL, WHO GOVERNS? (1961).
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porate decisionmaking. It also avoids arbitrary definitions of control
such as, "Who has the power to select the board of directors?", by con-
centrating on the more straightforward, "Who makes critical decisions
in the firm?" Also obviated by this approach is the problem of specify-
ing an arbitrary cutoff percentage of stock ownership to determine con-
trol. The tactical flaws of structural studies are thus absent.
Further, since this strategy will allow virtually any pattern of con-
trol to emerge, it avoids the strategic errors of prior studies. Study of
actual corporate decisions could reveal power centers within the
technostructure, among lending institutions, or in the hands of govern-
ment bureaucrats as well as with the traditional contend-
ers-stockholders and managers; it does not assume away part of the
problem by focusing only on the latter two groups.
Too, the study of decisions does not preclude the possibility that
contesting groups bring resources other than voting power to bear on
internal corporate political battles. Through such a method, the impact
of formal organizational authority, information, and legal advantage
could be evaluated rather than ignored as has been the case in many
prior studies.49 The method does not systematically exclude the possi-
bility that control is located where it is for reasons other than concen-
tration or dispersion of shareholdings. Since these strategic flaws as
well as the tactical problems discussed above are all avoided by a re-
search strategy based on the examination of key corporate decisions,
such a strategy is theoretically superior to any of the studies conducted
to date.
The question of which decisions to study is, of course, a critical
one. The outcome of proxy fights would clearly be of prime interest,
but, unfortunately for researchers, proxy fights are relatively rare.
Ranked behind proxy fights might be the selection and dismissal of top
executives and board members. Broad policy decisions such as
diversification, rate of growth, means of attaining growth (acquisition
vs. internal expansion), and preferred capital structure are also of inter-
est. Ultimately, the individual researcher would have to decide which
decisions were most important, and that judgment would, of course, be
subject to legitimate scholarly challenge.
50
49. To their great credit, Berle and Means did include legal evidence in their original
work. See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 4, at 119-252.
50. The claim that the really important decisions are not made consciously or explicitly
at all, but are made implicitly or "behind the scenes" by those "really in control" removes
the control issue from the realm of testable theory and places it in the realm of ideological
commitment. For this reason such criticism cannot be viewed as legitimate. This argument
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Research strategies based on examination of the actual corporate
decisionmaking process itself, while theoretically superior to other
methods, hardly constitute a methodological panacea. Indeed, certain
pragmatic difficulties are both obvious and substantial. First, large cor-
porations are not inclined to let researchers study their internal opera-
tions in depth. They are private institutions in spite of their public
impact and thus need not permit academic scrutiny. Corporate deci-
sion-making has been examined by Cyert and March
5' and by Carter,5 2
in addition to the extensive analysis of General Motors done by Druck-
er.53 These studies, however, were concerned with matters other than
corporate control and are unlikely to be repeated on a large scale.
In light of the growing insistence that corporations shoulder
greater social responsibility for their decisions than in the past, disclo-
sure of previously proprietary information to various corporate constit-
uencies has increased. Disclosure of the decisionmaking process may,
in fact, come to be seen as essential to corporate social responsibility
and greater access to the process might be afforded to academic
researchers.
However, researchers' access to the corporate decisionmaking
process might well be limited, now and in the future, to accounts ap-
pearing in the business press-Fortune, Business Week, Forbes, Wall
Street Journal, and so on. Data obtained from these sources are a poor
substitute for personal observation, as they tend to be simplistic, im-
pressionistic, and filtered through the lens of the reporter. Further, the
company involved may have released the story through an official
channel and thus filtered the information itself.
A second problem inherent in the behavioral approach is that a
truly massive effort would be required in order to draw any meaningful
conclusions with respect to the economy as a whole. Considerable en-
ergy would be necessary to locate control even in a single firm and it is
doubtful that the findings for any one firm could be legitimately gener-
alized to a group of firms, let alone the whole economy. A redeeming
virtue of the method, however, is that each individual project-the
study of a single firm-would contribute to an understanding of corpo-
is advanced against the "pluralist" political scientists by Bachrach and Baratz. See W. CON-
NOLLY, THE BIAS OF PLURALISM 51-64 (1969).
51. R. CYERT & J. MARCH, A BEHAVIORAL THEORY OF THE FIRM (1963).
52. Carter, The Behavioral Theory of the Firm and Top-Level Corporate Decisions, 16
AD. SCI. Q. 413 (1971).
53. P. DRUCKER, THE CONCEPT OF THE CORPORATION (1946).
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rate control, whereas further structural analysis contributes virtually
nothing.
The Methodology Dilemma
The present status of the existent and proposed methodologies for
locating corporate control can be summarized as follows: First, struc-
tural analysis of share-ownership patterns and interlocking directorates
is incapable of determining who controls the corporation. Second,
massive research is necessary for behavioral analysis to investigate the
issue adequately, and such research is virtually "dead in the water"
until the corporate decision-making process becomes more accessible to
academic researchers. However, the movement to increase and expand
corporate disclosure may provide the improved access to corporate
decisionmaking that is necessary if we are ever to conclusively identify
the locus of corporate power.
This dilemma does not mean that one is unable to draw some con-
clusions with respect to the locus of corporate power, however. It does
mean that those who demand conclusive empirical proof are destined
to be dissatisfied, at least in the short run. The following section brings
together the evidence that is available and draws a conclusion that
should satisfy all but the most skeptical observers of the corporate
scene.
The Locus of Corporate Power
In order to determine the locus of corporate power, it will be nec-
essary to list the possible contestants, briefly examine the roles played
by minor contestants, and examine in depth the relative power of the
principal contestants. This last phase of the analysis will include, but
not be limited to, answering the questions, "Who participates?" and
"Who has political resources?" which, standing alone, were judged in-
adequate to resolve the corporate control issue.
The Contestants
The inquiry begins with a list of contestants in the corporate power
struggle. Earlier in this Article 54 it was suggested that, historically, cor-
porate control had shifted from the state to the stockholders and that
the current debate rages over whether or not control has now shifted
from the stockholders to the professional managers. As phrased, this
issue involves three possible loci of corporate power. Recent theories
54. See text accompanying notes 2-12 supra.
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have added others: Galbraith's technostructure 5 government bureau-
cats (the state) in accordance with Weidenbaum's second managerial
revolution theory;56 labor unions; and special interest groups such as
environmentalists, women's rights activists, racial minorities, and an-
tinuclear power groups. Institutional investors can be subsumed under
the heading of stockholders since their potential power derives from the
voting power of the shares they hold. Finally, financial institutions as
lenders to large corporations have a political resource-financial lever-
age-sufficiently unique to warrant a separate classification.
Roles Played by Minor Contestants
Having identified the most plausible wielders of corporate control,
it would be useful to examine the roles played by each. The following
section suggests that most contenders play at best a minor role in the
corporate control drama.
The roles of some of the actors can be identified quite easily. The
state, for example, as represented by bureaucrats in the many govern-
ment regulatory agencies affecting business, clearly has a profound im-
pact on corporate decisionmaking. Possessing the ultimate political
resource-coercive power-the state virtually always prevails when it
chooses to act. In recent years, through the establishment of new legis-
lation and new regulatory agencies, the state has chosen to act in an
increasing number of areas-employment, product safety, plant safety,
marketing practices and so on. As yet, however, the state has fallen far
short of replacing internal corporate decisionmaking to the extent that
Weidenbaum suggests. In sum, governmental action with respect to
corporate control can best be viewed as circumscribing the area in
which corporate decisions can be made.
Labor unions and, to a lesser extent, outside pressure groups can
also bring potential coercive power to bear on corporate decisions. The
power of unions to strike, and the power of special interest groups to
boycott and demonstrate, can be formidable. Indeed, these groups
have successfully influenced corporate decisions in a number of areas.
Labor unions, for example, have greatly improved the lot of industrial
workers in many industries to the point that the workers share most of
the benefits of our affluent society. Other interest groups have the po-
tential for similar success. Indeed, labor unions have become institu-
55. GALBRAITH, supra note 15, at 71.
56. Weidenbaum, The New Wave of Government Regulation of Business, 15 Bus. &
Soc. REV. 81, 85 (1975).
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tionalized fixtures in the corporate decisionmaking process in matters
related to worker well-being. Because the unions' influence has been
limited to worker well-being, however, no significant measure of corpo-
rate control can be ascribed to labor unions; they, like the state, only
tend to bound the area of corporate decision-making.
Lending institutions, too, place limits on corporate decision-mak-
ing in certain areas. Their interest in corporate affairs, however, is
mostly limited to protection of their investments, which usually can be
protected through means other than seizing control. The principal re-
source of the lending institutions, financial leverage, occasionally is
mobilized in an effort to influence a firm's decisions, as illustrated by
the Iowa Beef Processers Inc. and the Eastern Airlines examples de-
scribed earlier.57 In actual contests for corporate control, however, this
resource would probably be important in very few cases.
The technostructure, described by Galbraith as the collection of
technical functionaries within the corporation,58 is somewhat more
difficult to analyze in terms of corporate control. Essentially, Galbraith
argues that decisionmaking in the large firm has become so technically
complex that it necessarily must be fragmented and delegated to small
groups of technical specialists. Corporate decisions are not made ex-
plicitly at all, he argues, but rather are determined by the combined
inputs of the elements of the technostructure. The implication is that
the various inputs fit nicely together so that no "decision".per se is nec-
essary. Through this process the technostructure has seized control of
corporation, according to Galbraith.
Galbraith's theory, while intuitively pleasing, is based on a some-
what simplistic view of corporate decisionmaking. First, conflicting in-
puts of information may emerge from various subgroups of the
technostructure; marketing information may favor an action, while
financial analysis yields unfavorable data. Only higher level manage-
ment can resolve such a conflict. Second, corporate decisionmaking is
increasingly complicated by inputs from the noneconomic environ-
ments of business-political, social, and legal. To assume that the
technostructure can successfully rationalize and quantify such "soft"
inputs strains the imagination. Clearly some form of conscious deci-
sionmaking is still required; in fact, one might argue that it becomes
even more important.
Third, Galbraith underestimates the role of formal authority in
57. See notes 43, 44 & accompanying text supra.
58. GALBRAITH, supra note 15.
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corporations. Given the system of rewards and promotions in most
corporate hierarchies, it seems extremely likely that a high executive
who wishes to advance an individual cause will be able to find organi-
zational support. Management can make its wishes known to members
of the technostructure in various subtle and not-so-subtle ways; the de-
cisions of the technostructure, rather than those of management, may
well be predetermined. Further, management, because of its formal
authority in the organization, can arbitrarily overrule the recommenda-
tions of the technostructure. In short, Galbraith's theory of technical
determinism within the corporation ignores the realities of the hierar-
chical reward system found in most modem corporations.
With respect to the political resources of the technostructure, it can
be postulated that they include knowledge, expertise, and control of
information. Unfortunately, any individual subgroup of the technos-
tructure has these resources only in a narrow sense; its knowledge, ex-
pertise, and information are confined to the subgroup's technical
specialty. Without considerable aggregation of the resources of the
subgroups, even the potential power of the technostructure remains
small.
The Principal Contestants
In the preceding paragraphs, the roles that various contenders play
in corporate power struggles have been examined.
That these roles are, for the most part, quite limited in effect and in
scope is apparent. Two contenders, stockholders and managers, are yet
to be examined, however. Not surprisingly, these are the two groups
around which the original controversy raged. In order to ascertain
what role is played by these two groups in the control drama, several
different types of evidence must be weighed simultaneously. Recogniz-
ing the inherent weaknesses in the research methods outlined above,59
the following discussion will nevertheless demonstrate that, when used
in combination with one another and coupled with observations on the
extreme liquidity of corporate shares, answers to the questions "Who
participates?" and "Who has political resources?" do permit tentative
resolution of the control issue.
The first question is "Who participates?" Clearly shareholders do
not participate in corporate decisionmaking in any meaningful sense;
they lack the time, knowledge, and, in most cases, the inclination to do
so. Further, save for the annual shareholder meeting, they lack a fo-
59. See text accompanying notes 16-53 supra.
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rum for participation. Even though stockholders' meetings have be-
come liveler in recent years, shareholder proposals are still routinely
defeated by large margins. Direct participation by shareholders is
largely nonexistent.
Indirect participation through the nominal representatives of the
stockholder-the board of directors-is largely a perfunctory ritual as
well. Mace reports that board members are chosen by the chief execu-
tive officer, usually the president.60 Inside directors--corporate execu-
tives-are directly subordinate to the chief executive and, in any case,
represent management rather than stockholders. Outside directors are
often selected for their cooperativeness so that board meetings will run
smoothly.61 Outside directors are also often chosen for their prestige in
the corporate community, which usually means that they are the chief
executives of other firms.62 Therefore, there is a considerable overlap
of chief executive officers and outside directors. Because of this, the
rules of etiquette for outside directors seem to include a respect for a
chief executive's autonomy on his own corporate turf. In summary,
Mace concludes that management, particularly the chief executive,
dominates the board of directors; 63 little voice is provided the share-
holders through the board.
As for political resources, managers have access to certain assets
that most outside directors and virtually all shareholders lack, includ-
ing: time (managers are full-time professionals; outside directors usu-
ally have their own firms to worry about); knowledge and expertise
with respect to the firm's operations (few outside directors and virtually
no shareholders can match the firm's managers on this dimension);
control of information (managers have direct control over the informa-
tion available to shareholders and directors); and formal authority in
the firm (shareholders and outside directors have none). All of these
resources are in addition to the coercive power of dismissal held over
the directors by the chief executive. It therefore comes as no surprise
that corporate boards are usually the allies and not the adversaries of
the firm's management.
As if this were not enough, corporations are increasingly employ-
ing executive committees or finance committees of the board of direc-
tors to handle many of the decisions that would normally reach the full
60. MACE, supra note 25, at 94.
61. Id at 98-100.
62. Id at 87.
63. Id. at 181.
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board. This specialization of function further isolates most of the di-
rectors and the stockholders from the decisionmaking process.
Corporate managers can also count on certain legal advantages as
political resources in their quest to control the corporation. Both state
corporation laws and SEC regulations64 seem to give the managers a
distinct advantage over stockholders in the process of corporate deci-
sionmaking. For example, the shareholders' power to participate in the
governance of the corporation is severely limited by the fact that in
many prominent chartering states, notably including Delaware,
65
stockholders are prevented from initiating certain changes in corporate
structure and operations. If only the board of directors can propose
certain types of change, the shareholders are effectively precluded from
even voting on them. Additionally, the board often wields effective
veto power over many changes shareholders might introduce, such as
mergers, sale of substantially all assets, and charter amendments.
These legal restrictions sharply curtail the shareholders' ability to di-
rectly participate in corporate affairs.
Legal advantage also accrues to managers in cases where share-
holders attempt to secure real representation on the board of directors.
If stockholders wish to place their own representatives on the board,
they must solicit their own proxies; they cannot utilize the company
proxy ballot. This normally entails considerable expense in publicly
held corporations. Thus shareholders, like voters in one-party nations,
are usually presented with only one slate of candidates. Cumulative
voting, a rule that would markedly enhance the probability of minority
shareholder representation on the board of directors, is not required in
most states, including Delaware,66 where a large percentage of major
corporations are chartered. Clearly, management has a distinct legal
advantage when it comes to denying shareholders even an indirect
voice in corporate governance.
Occasionally, a group of shareholders becomes sufficiently dissat-
isfied with the performance of a firm's management to attempt to re-
move the incumbents from office. In the resulting proxy fight, when the
challenging group tries to solicit a majority of the proxies and elect its
64. In R. NADER, M. GREEN & J. SELIGMAN, CONSTITUTIONALIZING THE CORPORA-
TION: THE CASE FOR FEDERAL CHARTERING OF GIANT CORPORATIONS (1976), the authors
report that SEC proxy rules do not protect shareholder rights in nominating and electing
directors, id at 95, and deny shareholders the opportunity to communicate opposition to
management proposals, id. at 115. Further, the SEC usually rules for management when
management questions the propriety of shareholder proposals. Id n. at 94-95.
65. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 242(c)(1), 251, 271, 275 (Michie 1974 & Supp. 1977).
66. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 214 (Michie 1974).
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own board of directors the relative concentration of a firm's shares
comes into play.
The question "How many shareholders hold what percentage of
the shares?" lies at the heart of most inquiries into the locus of corpo-
rate control. Many researchers claim that from five to ten percent of
the outstanding shares is an appropriate minimum for corporate con-
trol.67 But, when a proxy fight actually develops, the relevant percent-
age is not five, ten or even twenty percent; it is a majority of the
outstanding shares, or fifty percent plus one. Given the inherent ad-
vantage in other political resources held by incumbent management,
any ownership position of less than ten percent held by the insurgent
group is a relatively trivial factor in a proxy fight, as the following
paragraphs will demonstrate.
First, the management has the company's financial and organiza-
tional resources at its disposal. Incumbent management may finance
its defense with corporate funds while the challengers will be reim-
bursed only if they win. The risk of wasting a great amount of money
must weigh heavily on potential insurgents. Potential uses of this
money are several. Since the last-dated proxy is the relevant one in
proxy battles, contesting groups strive to obtain each shareholder's final
proxy. This contest may entail several attempts to solicit proxies, a se-
vere drain on the financial resources of the challengers but no drain on
the incumbents, who are using company money. This economic advan-
tage is especially pronounced in management's ability to hire profes-
sional proxy solicitors. In addition, management may utilize the
services of company personnel--clerical and sales persons-and facili-
ties, such as photo copy machines, in its defense effort without cost to
itself. The cost-lost time and expended materials-is absorbed by the
firm.
Second, management has control over much of the information
relevant to a proxy battle. Rebellious shareholders can obtain share-
holder lists (often only after considerable delay) but little else.
Third, certain legal advantages accrue to management in proxy
battles. Prominent among these is the device of staggered terms for the
firm's directors. Where this ploy is used, insurgents must mount a sus-
tained effort to remove the managers since not all of the directors can
be removed in a single proxy election.
The existence of an efficient national stock market also provides
management with an advantage in its relationship with shareholders.
67. See text accompanying notes 10-12 supra.
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It is likely that many potential proxy challenges are effectively diffused
because stockholders realize that their losses can be cut considerably if
they simply sell their shares rather than commencing an expensive
proxy fight with its attendant minimal chance of success. This simple
calculus is not lost on institutional shareholders who, because of their
relatively large holdings, are often in the best position to influence a
corporation's management. These institutions generally follow the
"Wall Street Rule" which dictates that an investor dissatisfied with a
firm's performance simply sells its stock in that firm rather than trying
either to alter management decisions or, in extreme cases, to replace the
managers. Since institutional holdings constitute between forty and
fifty percent of all common stockholdings, 68 the benefit to incumbent
management is substantial.
If institutional holdings continue to grow, however, they may
reach a point where they are too large to be easily absorbed by other
investors, at least not without a significant negative impact on the share
price. Should this occur, institutional investors might be forced into
more active participation in corporate governance merely to protect
their investments. Thus far, this has not happened.
With the deck thus stacked in favor of incumbent management, it
is not surprising to find that virtually all elections of corporate directors
go uncontested.69 Further, challengers are aware that success rates are
very small in contested elections; the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion reports that incumbent management retained control in over
99.8% of all elections held from 1956 through 1973.70
Given the significant resource advantages that accrue to managers
in proxy battles, including legal, financial, organizational, and informa-
tional factors, the principal battles for corporate control take place not
between disenchanted investors and managers but between other cor-
porations and incumbent managers. That is, most takeover attempts
involve other firms as the challengers, rather than an insurgent group
of shareholders. Even in these cases, a proxy fight is rarely the vehicle
chosen to take over another firm; tender offers seem to be the dominant
68. See BLUMBERG, supra note 20, at 95, reporting that in 1972 institutional holdings
exceeded 45% of all NYSE stocks.
69. Calculations made from SEC data as reported by Ralph Nader's Corporate Ac-
countability Research Group show that from 1956 through 1973 fewer than one percent of
corporate director elections were even contested. See R. NADER, M. GREEN & J. SELIGMAN,
CONSTITUTIONALIZING THE CORPORATION: THE CASE FOR THE FEDERAL CHARTERING OF
GIANT CORPORATIONS 91 (1976).




When another firm attempts a takeover, the resource balance is apt
to be much more even. The challengers have the financial and organi-
zational resources of their own firms at their disposal and, if the tender
offer route is taken, can avoid the legal impediments to "hostile" take-
overs that the proxy machinery provides. Not surprisingly, takeover
attempts by corporations, particularly those involving tender offers, are
much more successful than those attempted by insurgent shareholder
groups.
In summary, despite the fact that shareholders, in the aggregate,
hold the single resource-voting power-that ultimately could be dis-
positive in all corporate control struggles, they lack both the incentive
and other political resources to seriously threaten management hegem-
ony. Incentive to challenge incumbent management is further weak-
ened by a highly efficient market for corporate shares, in which a
dissatisfied shareholder can dispose of stock at considerably less cost
than would be incurred in an attempt to replace the management. In
addition, stockholders rarely overcome their lack of inherent cohesive-
ness because management has sufficient resources, including time, in-
formation, legal advantage and the financial and organizational
strength of the firm itself, to effectively neutralize their potential aggre-
gate power. In short, as long as the corporate control debate based on
the dispersion of share holdings centers around whether five percent or
ten percent is the appropriate minimum for control, it will remain
largely irrelevant; managerial power is solidly based on factors other
than an extreme dispersion of shares.
Conclusion
It appears that management is firmly in control of corporate enter-
prise in general, although exceptions obviously exist. Shareholders do
control some firms in the corporate economy, but given the advantages
that managers have over shareholders in control contests, the number
of such firms is relatively small. Management control is increasingly
being circumscribed externally by governmental regulations and is oc-
casionally displaced by lending institutions but, for the most part, the
governance of the corporation is the domain of corporate managers.
71. In a recent Article on corporate takeovers, only one proxy fight, Curtiss Wright's
attempt to annex Kennecott Copper, was mentioned; tender offers dominated the discussion
of corporate control struggles. See A. Ehrbar, Corporate Takeovers Are Here to Stay, FoR-
TUNE, May 8, 1978, at 91.
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The role of the law in establishing the relative power of sharehold-
ers and managers has largely been ignored by social scientists who
study corporate control. While the directional impact of the law is usu-
ally clear enough, the extent of its impact is empirically indeterminate.
This situation is unfortunate for several reasons. Given the inherent
problems with structural analysis of corporate shareholdings discussed
earlier herein, and given that, currently, the discussion is focused on
arbitrary definitions of control that implicitly concede widely dispersed
shareholdings, careful analysis of existing law and of changes in the
law probably can tell us more about corporate control than can further
studies of share ownership. This, then, is one challenge facing legal
scholars: a continuing evaluation of the law as it applies to the locus of
control of the corporation. The second, and greater, challenge, given
our tentative conclusion that control rests with management, is to pro-
vide models for a legal framework that can assure that managers fulfill
their corporate social responsibility.
